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Abstract. Even, Goldreich and Micali showed at Crypto'89 that the 
existence of signature schemes secure against known message attacks im-
plies the existence of schemes secure against adaptively chosen message 
attacks. Unfortunately, this transformation leads to a rather impractical 
scheme. We exhibit a similar security amplification, which takes the given 
scheme to a new signature scheme that is not even existentially forge-
able under adaptively chosen message attacks. Additionally, however, our 
transformation will be practical: The complexity of the resulting scheme 
is twice that of the original scheme. 
The principles of both transformations carry over to block encryption 
systems. It is shown how they can be used to convert a block encryp-
tion system secure against known plaintext attacks to a system secure 
against chosen plaintext attacks. For both schemes it is shown that if 
the transformed scheme can be broken given a number, T, of encryp-
tions of adaptively chosen plaintexts, then the original scheme can be 
broken given encryptions of T uniformly chosen plaintexts. In this case, 
however, the application of the technique of Even, Goldreich and Micali 
leads to the more efficient scheme. The transformed scheme has the same 
key length as the original, and ciphertexts are doubled in length. As an 
example, when applied to DES the transformed scheme is secure against 
differential cryptanalysis, which relies on the ability to get encryptions 
of plaintext pairs with proper differences. 
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1 Introduction 
Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [5) distinguish between several levels of security 
for digital signature schemes. Any such level, is defined by the extent to which 
an attacker has access to a true signer and the goal of the attacker. A digital 
signature scheme is said to have a given security level, if the scheme is secure 
against the corresponding attacker. 
In the strongest level of security described in [5], the attacker is allowed to 
first use a true signer as an oracle, i.e., he can obtain a signature on any message 
of his choice. The attacker's goal is to generate a signature on some new message, 
i.e., a message he hasn't requested the oracle to sign. A digital signature scheme 
that is secure against such an attacker is called not existentially forgeable under 
adaptively chosen message attacks. This attacker has the weakest possible goal 
while having the strongest possible access to the signer. Therefore, this level 
of security is thought to be the most desirable. In [5], a scheme is exhibited 
with this level of security, under the assumption that a family of claw-free one-
way trapdoor permutations exists. After [1], [8] and [10], the matter of secure 
signature schemes is, at least theoretically, settled: the existence of one-way 
functions is a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of signature 
schemes with this security level. It must be noted, however, that these theoretical 
schemes have, by their impracticality, little value in real life. 
We will consider schemes that are not existentially forgeable under known 
plaintext attacks. Here, an attacker has only passive access to the signature ora-
cle. More precisely, the attacker receives signatures on messages that are chosen 
uniformly at random, after which he has to produce a forgery on a new message. 
Our goal will be to transform a signature scheme that is secure against such an 
attacker into a signature scheme that is not existentially forgeable under adap-
tively chosen message attacks. Furthermore, we will demand that the complexity 
of the resulting scheme is almost the same as that of the original scheme. The 
resulting transformation is presented in Section 2. 
In the context of, so-called, on-line/off-line signatures, Even, Golclreich and 
Micali gave (in [3)) a transformation whose effect is the same security ampli-
fication, but with a loss of efficiency that would make the resulting scheme 
impractical for most applications where the signer is not able to perform off-line 
corn pu tations. 
As in [5), and in many other cryptographic schemes, their approach works 
with two independently generated instances of the signature scheme E that is 
given as input. The resulting keys constitute the keys for the instance of E. 
Given a message m oflength n that is to be signed. The first instance is used 
to authenticate the concatenation of 2n bit-strings, chosen uniformly at ran-
dom by the signer. Bit-wise, the message m is used to select n of these strings 
which are finally authenticated, one-by-one, using the second instance of E. For 
each new message, this procedure is repeated. As a result of this bit-wise sign-
ing technique, the complexity of the transformed scheme becomes, roughly, the 
complexity of E times the number of bits that are signed. Therefore the trans-
formation from [3] is not suitable to serve as a basis for security amplifications 
of practical signature schemes. 
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Interestingly, both the technique of [3] and the one used in this paper can 
a.lso be applied to conventional encryption schemes. As shown in Sect.ion 3 this 
will yield, given an encryption scheme secure against known plaintext attacks, 
a new scheme secure against chosen plaintext attacks. !\fore precisely, for both 
transformations it is shown that if the new scheme can be broken (i.e., a given 
ciphertext is decrypted or the key is recovered) given the encryptions of T cho-
sen plain texts, then the original scheme can be broken given the encryptions of 
T randomly chosen plaintexts. Furthermore, if the transformation is based on 
the principles of [3], then the transformed scheme has the same kE'y space as the 
original scheme and encryption of one message block requires just one applica-
tion of the given scheme (plus access to a. number of random bits). ln particular 
this implies that attacks on the transformed scheme based on differential crypt-
analysis, which require the ability to get encryptions of pairs of pla.intexts with 
proper differences (see [2]), will not be more efficient than attacks, where the 
plaintexts are chosen uniformly a.t random. Furthermore, it is shown that the 
new schemes a.re not more vulnerable against chosen ciphertext attack that the 
given scheme. 
2 Security Amplification of Signatures 
A signature scheme, E, is defined by a. tuple (k, Al, G, O", \/), where k is the 
security para.meter, J\1 the message space, G a key generation algorithm, o- a 
signature algorithm and V a verification algorithm. All algorithms are polyno-
mial time in k, and k determines the length of messages that can be signed (see 
[5] for further details). 
Let E be any ::>uch signature scheme and let J\i[ ( k) denote the message space 
and IM ( k) I its size corresponding to k. Moreover we assume that M ( k) = 
{ O, l}t(k), where t (k) is some non-constant polynomial in k. 
Let M ( k) denote a. subset of M ( k) that consists of a negligible1 large fraction 
p( k) of M ( k). For instance, M ( k) could consist of all hi t-st.rings of length t, 
with the last t/2 bits set to zero. Using E as a building block, a new scheme 
E = ( k, M, G, Cf, V) is constructed as follows: 
Message space 
The message space for security para.meter, k, is Af ( k) as defined above. 
Initialisation 
Let the security parameter k be given. To generate an instance of E, the 
signer runs G twice, yielding two key-pairs (pk1, 8k1) and (pk2, 8k2). The 
public-key pk for the instance of E will be (pk1,pk2), and the secret key 8k 
will be (sk1,sk2). 
Signing 
Let m E M ( k) be the message to be signed. The signer chooses a random 
1 A non-negative function f : IN-+ IR is negligible iff 'r/c > 0 :3no E IN'r/n E IN: n > 
no=? f(n)-::; n-". 
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pair ( m1 , m2), with m1 , m2 E M ( k), such that m.1 EB m2 = m, and computes 
o-; (mi) for i = 1, 2, where O'i( m;) denotes a signature in E, with respect to the 
key-pair (pk;, sk;). The signature, O'(m), in Eis (m1, m2, 0'1(mi), 0'2(m2)). 
Verification 
To verify a signature O'(m) on m E M(k) with respect to pk, the receiver 
checks whether m1 EB m2 J: m, and whether u;(m;) is a valid signature in E 
with respect to pk; for i = 1, 2. 
It is now shown that if E is secure against a known message attack, then E is 
secure against a chosen message attack. 
We first need a lemma which says that it is very unlikely that O"i( m1) and 
u2 ( m~) corresponding to signatures on two different messages, m, m' E M ( k), 
can be combined to a valid signature in E. 
Consider the following game involving two players A and B. Player B submits 
any member m1 E M(k) to A, and A returns a random pair (mL m~), with 
mi, m.~ E M(k), such that m} EEl m~ = m1 . They repeat this procedure, say, r 
times. This results in a sequence 
( 1 1 1) ( r r r) in , rn1 , m.2 , ... , m , m 1 , m 2 , 
such that m{ EB m~ = mi for j = 1 ... r. B is allowed to choose the values of mi 
adaptively. B wins if he can find a pair (ml', m'.lJ such that ml' EB m~ E J\f(k) 
and u f. v and 1:::; u,v:::; r. 
Lemma 2.1 In the game described above, B 's probability of losing the game is 
at least 1 - 1(1· - l)p(k). 
Proof Define for 1 ::; u, v :::; 1· and u 'I v, the stochastic variable Xu,v = 
mj' EB m.~. The probability that Xu,v E M(k) is clearly fully determined by A's 
uniform coin flips, and therefore equal to p( k). As there are r( r - 1) pairs ( u, v), 
B will win with probability at most r(1· - l)p(k) and hence lose the game with 
the claimed probability. 0 
Now consider the signature scheme E described above. Let A be any prob-
abilistic polynomial time algorithm that executes an adaptively chosen message 
attack on E, and let A's signature requests be on messages 
1 r(k) M(k) 1n,. .. ,m. E , 
with r·(k) polynomially bounded. The signer then returns 
( ( 1 1 r(k) 1'(k) u1 mi), u2(m2)), .. ., (l11(m1 )), 0"2(m2 ), 
as required. 
Proposition 2.2 If the signature scheme E is not existentially forgeable 1mde1· 
known message attacks, the attacker A has only negligible probability of out-
putting a signature 0-(1h) in E, where m 'Im{ for j = 1, ... , r(k), and 0-(m.) is 
a valid signature with respect to pk;, with i = 1 or i = 2. 
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Proof By standard simulation techniques. Suppose A 's probability of success 
is non-negligible (in k). Let a signer S' in E, with public key pl.:, be given. \Ve 
will use the attacker A to conduct a successful known message attack on signer 
S', thus contradicting the assumption on D. 
Generate an instance (pk', sk') in E. Choose i at random in { 1, 2}, and put 
pk = pk; and pk' = pk3_;. Now present the resulting key (pk1 , pk2 ) for E to the 
attacker. The signer S' with public key pk;, used as a subroutine in the sinmla-
tion, will output signatures on randomly chosen messages. More specifically, the 
simulation works as follows. 
1. Receive message m E M(k) from the attacker. 
2. Receive a signature O';(mi) from S', where S chooses m; E Af(k) uniformly 
at random. 
~). Compute m3-i = ni; tfl m and 0'3_;(m3_;). Forward Ci'(m) to the attacker. 
As the attacker cannot distinguish this simulation from a true signer in E, the 
probability that 0-( 1h) is a forgery of S's signature is half A 's success probability. 
This is still non-negligible. D 
Theorem 2.3 Let E be any signature scheme that is not tTistentinlly forgeable 
under known ·me,58age attacks. Then the signature sclurne E 1s not u·istcntially 
forgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks 
Proof Let !'ii. E f\:f(k) and let 0-(ih) = (m 1 ,m2 1 0'i(rn 1 ),0'~(rn2)) be a forgery 
in E on a new message, obtained after an adaptively chosen rnessage attack. 
By Proposition 2.2, except with negligible probability 0"1(m1) = o-1(ml), and 
1T2(m2) = o-2(m'.;), for some u, v with 1 :S u, v ::=; r(k) and v f. I' (notation as in 
Proposition 2.2). So we must have that mJ. i±l m~ = rh. However, by Lemma 2 .1, 
this has only negligible probability. D 
3 Symmetric Encryption Schemes 
Let an encryption scheme with key space, I\, plaint.ext space, lvf, and ciphertext 
space, C', be given. Encryption of m E J\J under key k EI\ is denoted by Ek(m) 
and decryption of c E C under k is denoted by Dk( c). Such a scheme will be 
denoted by (E, D, K, M, C). 
As for signature schemes it is possible to classify attacks against au encryption 
scheme in terms of the goal of the attack and the amount of information, which 
is available to the attacker. Usually two goals are distinguished: 
- Decrypting a given ciphertext, c E C. 
- Finding the key. 
Other goals could be to find some information about the key or to find an alterna-
tive algorithm for decrypting (corresponding to "uni versa! break'' of signatures; 
see [5]). Of these two goals it is clearly harder to find the secret key than to just 
decrypt a given ciphertext. Four types of attacks can be distinguished: 
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- Given just the knowledge of the encryption scheme; 
-- Given a number of pairs ( m, Ek( m)), where m is chosen by the owner of k 
according to some distribution; 
- Chosen plaintext attack: The attacker may choose adaptively a. numlwr of 
plaintexts, rn 1 ,m2 , ... and get Ek(rni),Ek(rn2), .... 
- Chosen ciphertext attack: The attacker may choose adaptively a number of 
ciphertexts c1, c2, ... and get Dk ( m1), Dk ( m2), .... 
The last two attack are similar in many situations. Based on these definitions 
the highest security level of an encryption scheme is security against getting the 
key under a chosen plaint.ext. or ciphertext attack. 
In the following it is shown how the principle used in the previous section 
can be used to turn a scheme, secure against known plaint.ext. attack where the 
messages are chosen uniformly at random, into a scheme which is secure against 
a chosen plaint.ext attack. This transformation requires twice as long key and 
the ciphertext is doubled. This may make the transformed ::;ystem inadequate 
for many applications. Therefore, the const.rnction is improved in Sect.ion :3.2, 
where a similar transformation is given which does not double the key size. 
3.1 Applying the Basic Method 
In the following it will be assumed that M = { 0, 1 }" for some parameter n, but 
the construction works for any message space for which 
There is a binary operator, 1:;), on M and a neutral element. m 11 E 1\1 for this 
operator such that (M,8,mo) is a group. 
Efficient algorithms for selecting elements in M and computing both c:, and 
its inverse exist. 
Given an encryption scheme (E, D, K, M, C) , 
a new scheme (E(l l, D(l), J((l), M(l), C( 1 )) is defined as follows: 
- K( 1l = K x K. 
!vf(l) = lv1. 
G( 1l = C x C. 
Ek~:k)rn) = (Ek, (mi), Ek 2 (m2)) where m 1 is chosen uniformly at randorn 
in lv1 and m2 = m EB m1. 
- Di~'.k 2 (c1, c2) =Dk, (c1) EfJ Dk 2 (c2). 
Theorem 3.1 If (E, D, K, M, C') is secure against known plainteJ:l attacks af-
ter getting T E IN encryptions of uniformly chosen plaintexts. 
Then (E( 1 l, D( 1l, K(ll, M(i), C(ll) is secure against chosen plainte,r:t attacks 
where the attacker is allowed to choose T plaintexts adaptively. 
Furthermoi-e, if(E( 1l,D( 1l,J<(l),Af( 1),C(l)) can be broken in a chosen ci-
phertext attack given decryptions of T ciphertexts, then (E, D, K, !vf, C) can be 
broken in a similar attack also requiring T decryptions. 
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Proof The proof goes along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2.2, but is 
somewhat simpler. 
First consider a chosen plaintext attack aiming at decrypting a given cipher-
text (c1, c2). Then a given ciphertext c can be decrypted in the original system 
in a known message attack as follows. If k is the (unknown) key in this system 
we select a key-pair for the new system by choosing i E { 1, 2, } a.t random and 
letting k; = k and choosing k3-i E J{ at random. Construct a ciphertext as 
c; = c and c3_; = Ek 3 _, (m') where m' E M is chosen at random. The chosen 
plaintext attack can now be simulated in the same way as the adaptively chosen 
message attack on E in the proof of Proposition 2.2. In the end we will get a 
plaintext m" corresponding to (c1 ,c2 ) and finally output m = m' EB m" as the 
plaintext corresponding to c. 
The simulated attack will construct ciphertexts with the same distribution as 
the real attack. Thus, it will output the plaintext corresponding to ( c1 , c2 ) with 
the same probability, and by the definition of the new scheme the decryption of 
c is derived correctly. 
Next consider attack aiming at recovering the secret key. This situation is as 
above, except that we don't have to generate ( c1 , c2 ). If the attack outputs the 
entire key, then we can get k as k;. If the attack only outputs one of the two 
keys we will get k with probability ~. 2 
Finally, a chosen ciphertext atta~k against (£( 1), D(ll ,J\:(1 l, M(l), C(ll) can 
be simulated given a chosen ciphertext attack against (E, D, K, M, C) in such a 
way that each decryption in the new scheme requires one decryption in the old 
scheme. O 
An advantage of (£( 1), D(l), /((1), M(l), C( 1l) is that if known plaintext at-
tacks against (E, D, K, M, C) require time linear in II<I (the size of I<), no 
chosen plaintext attack can be better. A disadvantage is that, although the key 
length is doubled, exhaustive key search in (EC 1l,DC 1l,J((ll,M(ll,C{l)) can 
still be done in time linear in IKI ([6]). Thus we get a lower bound of at most 
IKI = v'fKf1i/ for chosen plaintext attacks. This is not a sufficient security 
bound. 
3.2 Improving the Security 
As mentioned above, the security bound of (E(ll, D( 1l, J((ll, Af( 1l, C(ll) is not 
satisfactory, and furthermore, it might be too inefficient to use two encryp-
tions in (E, D, K, M, C) in order to encrypt a single message block. In the 
following another construction is given, which improves on both of these defi-
ciencies, while keeping the security amplification. This construction can be seen 
as an application of the principles of [3] to encryption schemes: use the given 
system (signature or encryption) to instantiate a one-time system (by signing 
the public key /encrypting the key) and use the one-time system on the input 
2 The proof of this case is the reason for choosing k = k 1 with probability t - in the 
proofs of the other claims it would have been sufficient to let k = k1 with probability 
1. 
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(message/plaintext). The new scheme (E( 2), D(2), 1{(2), Af(2), C( 2)) is defined as 
follows: 
- !{(2) = J(. 
- Af( 2) = M. 
- C(2 ) = C x C. 
- Ek2l(m) = (Ek(m1),m2 ), where m1 is chosen uniformly at random in M 
and m2 = m EB m1. 
- Dk2)(c1,c2) = Dk(ci)EBc2. 
Theorem 3.2 If (E, D, J{, M, C) is secure against known plainte:d attacks af-
ter getting T E 1N encryptions of uniformly chosen plaintexts. 
Then (E( 2), D(2), J((2), Af( 2), C(2)) is secui·e against chosen plainte:d attacks 
where the attacker is allowed to choose T plainte:i.;ts adaptively. 
Furthermore, if (E( 2), D( 2 ), J{( 2 ), Af( 2), C( 2l) can be broken in a chosen ci-
phertea;t attack given decryptions of T cipherte:i:ts, then (E, D, K, M, C) can be 
broken in a similar attack also requiring T decryptions. 
Proof The proof follows the previous quite closely. Whenever, the attacker 
against (E( 2), D(2), J(( 2), Af( 2), C(2 l) asks for an encryption of m, the simula-
tor gets a pair (m1,ci) = (m1,Ek(m1)) for a randomly chosen m1 Eld from 
the owner of k and returns (c1, m1 EB m). This simulator constructs ciphertexts 
with the same distribution as if they were obtained by proper encryptions in 
(£(2l, D(2), g(2), Af(2l, C(2)). 
If the attack aims at decrypting a ciphertext ( c1 , c2) in 
(£( 2), D(2), J<( 2l, Af(2), C(2l) then a ciphertext, c in (E, D, K, M, C) can be 
decrypted by choosing c1 = c and c2 at random and then using the method 
sketched above to simulate the chosen plaint.ext attack. If m is the plaint.ext 
corresponding to ( c1 , c2 ) then m EB c2 is the plain text corresponding to c. If the 
attack outputs information about the key in (E(2), D(2), J{(2), Af(2), C( 2 l) , 
then the same information is obtained about the key in (E, D, J(, M, C) as they 
are equal. Again, a chosen ciphertext attack against (E(2l, D( 2), J-.:( 2), Af( 2), (.'( 2)) 
can easily be simulated given a chosen ciphertext attack against (E, D, I\, !If, C) 
D 
4 Other Applications 
The techniques desribed in this paper immediately carry over to message au-
thenticity codes (MAC's) based on pseudo-random functions. We describe this 
application only briefly, and leave it to the reader to complete the details. 
Given a family of pseudo-random functions that is secure against known 
plain text attacks, we construct a MAC with two independent functions f 1 and h 
from the family. The message space for the MAC is defined as in our application 
to signature schemes, i.e., superpolynomial in the size of the security parameter, 
but a negligible fraction of the domain of the functions. Splitting a message is 
also done in the same way. Given a message m and a random splitting m 1 , m2 , 
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the MAC is now computed as (f1(m1), h(m2). This MAC is then secure against 
adaptively chosen plaintext attacks. 
In the context of a special class of proofs of knowledge, "split-and-divert" 
techniques similar to those employed in this paper, have been used for efficient 
transformations from honest verifier zero knowledge protocols to witness hiding 
protocols in [ 4]. 
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